The Forgotten War: Syria’s Conflict, Diplomacy, and Reintegration

All news of Syria has slipped from international attention but its crisis continues with no sense of an ending. Bashar Assad may have clung on to power and yet the warped world of post-war Syria shows the pyrrhic nature of his victory. All diplomatic efforts to find a political solution have flopped.

The country has inhabited a state of crisis for many years now, but its troubles have reached devastating levels: out of a total population of 22.1 million people, 15.3 million need humanitarian assistance in 2023 (an increase of 700,000 people since last year), 97% of the population lives in extreme poverty and over 80% lack food security.

Assad’s regime reportedly controls around two-thirds of Syria, although the verb ‘control’ is generous given large parts of these areas are dogged by crime, protest, and quiet insurgency. The final third of the country falls under a mishmash of authority, including Syrian opposition and Islamist forces in the northwest, and the Syrian Democratic Forces in the northeast.

As expressed by U.N. Special Envoy Geir Pedersen, conflict remains “very active” across the country, referring to the continual threat of ISIS and military capabilities of other insurgents.

Assad’s regime reportedly controls around two-thirds of Syria, although the verb ‘control’ is generous given large parts of these areas are dogged by crime, protest, and quiet insurgency.

Syria’s insecurity is heightened by external powers. Turkey, Israel and Russia have all launched raids in recent weeks and months, ensuring that the country grimly enters its 12th year of war.

Israeli operations have multiplied to counter Iran’s growing presence in Syria and disturb Tehran’s increasing use of aerial supply lines to arm allies (2023 began with Syria’s main international airport temporarily closed because of Israeli missiles which killed a couple of Syrian soldiers); Turkey’s assault on Kurdish positions in the north-east has not abated; and militant opposition groups in areas free from regime control continue to make battle with Russian airpower.

In December 2015, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2254 calling for fair elections, a new constitution, and credible, inclusive, and non-sectarian governance. Since then, the UN has led mediation between the Assad regime and opposition in order to reach a political settlement reflecting these aspirations; but these halting efforts have yielded nothing.

This is primarily because Assad’s resistance to the Geneva process which has hardened as the incentives for taking it seriously have weakened; the path of rehabilitation for Syria on a world stage no longer depends on its outcome given the growing number of MENA regimes who have signalled their intent to welcome Assad back into the fold.  

Syria’s patron, Russia, had committed itself to the process as a political settlement promised the easing of sanctions and access to funds for reconstruction. However, Assad defied pressure from Moscow, proving the limits of influential patrons to co-opt even weak clients.

Syria’s patron, Russia, had committed itself to the process as a political settlement promised the easing of sanctions and access to funds for reconstruction. However, Assad defied pressure from Moscow, proving the limits of influential patrons to co-opt even weak clients.

The obstinacy of the Assad regime to play ball has contributed to a firm belief amongst many observers that the current process has been exhausted and the time for a fundamentally new approach has arrived.

Throughout 2021, U.N. Special Envoy Geir Pedersen had been preparing for a new round of multilateral “step-for-step” diplomacy in 2022. Though it was always a tall order, hope that 2022 would revive diplomacy in Syria evaporated with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as the perishing of Western-Russian relations saw this initiative become redundant.

Last year, Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that would have extended cross-border aid to Syria by one year without Damascus’s backing; this marked the 17th time since 2011 it had used its veto to uphold Assad’s sovereignty over the country – and deprive the Syrian people of assistance.

Ukraine’s conflict is predicted to create a humanitarian crisis in Syria fiercer than any yet witnessed by the country. It is forcing basic services and the economy to the edge of collapse through its sharp increase of prices on necessities like fuel, aggravation of food insecurity, and redirection of humanitarian funding away from Syria to Ukraine.

The consequences of renewed crisis in Syria will not only be felt locally but could strike further afield in the region and beyond.

The position of the United States has been inconsistent. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has repeated Washington’s commitment to the 2015 UN resolution and dismissed any normalisation with the Assad regime.

However, the US proposal to facilitate the export of Egyptian gas and Jordanian electricity through Syria in order to help Lebanon’s energy crisis has been gaining momentum through 2022. Despite its compelling humanitarian rationale, it clearly violates US sanctions on the Assad regime.

This muddled policy reveals the US administration’s conflicting desire to maintain punitive action against the Assad regime

This muddled policy reveals the US administration’s conflicting desire to maintain punitive action against the Assad regime, and to encourage intra-Arab cooperation to soften Syria’s dependence on Iran.

Prompted by the reality that a negotiated settlement with Moscow is unworkable while war thunders in Ukraine, the Biden Administration has limited its activity in the country to counterterrorism operations and humanitarian assistance.

Washington’s waning interest in Syria reflects its broader attitude towards the Middle East as its energies are spent on great power competition in the East and Russian aggression in the West.

The 2011 uprisings in Syria represented another false spring in the Middle East. The nightmare of its failed revolution will continue to torment its people in another punishing year of privation and conflict.

The Failure of Diplomacy

In contrast to the naïve representations of Syria offered by Western travel bloggers and YouTubers touring regime-held areas, the country has yet to be reacquainted with any real stability. Also ReadSyria: failed, forgotten stateSyria: failed, forgotten state  Indeed, there is a growing possibility that its grinding conflict will worsen in 2023.    Shelling between Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-back groups, and fighting between rebel groups still plague civilian populations. In districts where Syrian forces have gained control, irregular conflicts persist through violent crime, often by riotous rebels whom the regime has supposedly brought into line.

Shelling between Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-back groups, and fighting between rebel groups still plague civilian populations.

A sense of lawlessness fills the South. A menacing mix of armed groups, including former rebels, ISIS fighters, and drug smugglers, are flourishing in the hinterlands. But the most threatening actors are the regime-connected armed forces and militias, whose activities include kidnappings for ransom and the forced abduction of suspected opponents.    

Israel and Jordan have looked on anxiously as the presence of Iranian-backed militias, narco-traffickers and Salafi-jihadis has thickened on their borders.

And now with domestic agitation in Iran, and Russian attention drained in Ukraine, the delicate balance of power overseen by the regime’s main patrons is strained.

Consequently, Assad’s control over sizable chunks of territory looks fragile.

It is true that the intensity of Syria’s fighting has decreased, particularly between the regime and the opposition. Although at least 3,825 people died in the conflict in 2022, it represents the lowest yearly toll since the start of the conflict more than a decade ago. This is partly because Russian air strikes have decreased since its invasion of Ukraine.

However, despite this welcome news, the militarism of external powers continues to undercut Syria’s stability and prolong its war.

The threat of escalating conflict between Israel and Iran looms large. This year started ominously with the temporary closure of Syria’s main international airport because of Israeli missiles, which killed two Syrian soldiers.

Israeli operations have multiplied to counter Iran’s growing presence in Syria, which is acting with greater lisence given Russian inattention, and disrupt its increasing use of aerial supply lines to arm allies.

Although at least 3,825 people died in the conflict in 2022, it represents the lowest yearly toll since the start of the conflict more than a decade ago. This is partly because Russian air strikes have decreased since its invasion of Ukraine.

The more immediate threat is a full-scale military operation by Turkey into Syria.
Turkey’s air assaults on Kurdish positions in the northeast have intensified since Nov. 13, when a bombing on Istanbul’s Istiklal Street, a popular shopping area, killed six people and injured 81 others. Ankara alleges that the PKK was responsible.

On Nov. 23, President Erdogan described Turkey’s strikes on Kurdish targets as "just the beginning" of a larger operation, intimating that another full-scale offensive of Syria was forthcoming (as waged in 2018 and 2019).

Facing domestic troubles in the lead-up to the 2023 Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections, it is likely that Erdogan will opt for the attractive distraction of war, eternally used by flagging autocrats.

ISIS is another threat for Syrian citizens yet to be decisively neutralized.

The caliphate remains a memory, but the Salafi-jihadi organization has evolved into a small but effective insurgency. The number of its attacks is thinning, though their executions have become more sophisticated; in December alone, ISIS craftily breached sensitive military facilities in the northeast, in addition to killing at least 20 people in regime areas.

The upkeep of counterterrorism pressure by the US in the northeast has been an essential factor averting an ISIS resurgence; however, with conflict now swallowing other parts of the world, its longevity is uncertain.

The organization’s potential for recovery largely lies in its thousands of imprisoned fighters, many of whom are haphazardly contained in the al-Hol detention facilities.

A sign of things to come, the SDF said in early December that its joint military operations with the U.S. against the ISIS group have halted due to the threat of Turkish ground offensive and airstrikes, a sign of things to come.  

The actual outbreak of war on the Turkish-Syrian border would breed volatility and offer opportunities for ISIS fighters to escape and even regroup. 

Equally, the threat of instability is found in the rising poverty of the public. 

The actual outbreak of war on the Turkish-Syrian border would breed volatility and offer opportunities for ISIS fighters to escape and even regroup. 

Syria’s economy has hit its lowest point since the start of its civil war, with spiraling inflation, failing currency, and worsening fuel shortages across the country.

As observed in late December by Geir Pedersen, the U.N. special envoy for Syria, the “needs of the Syrian people have reached the worst levels since the conflict began.”

In early December, two people were killed, including a policeman, when protesters in the southern Syrian city of Sweida stormed a provincial public building in an antigovernment protest.

And in recent days, protests against the regime have emerged in the southern province of Daraa, during which revolutionary songs were reclaimed and pre-Baath Party flags flown high. Modest protests against the regime and its forces began on Dec. 21 and have continued intermittently in at least half a dozen cities and towns across the South.

With 2023 forecast to be defined by a humanitarian crisis, localized anti-regime mobilizations will likely multiply and add to the country’s brittleness.

With many sources of present and potential instability in Syria, perceptions about the end of the civil war need revision. It is little wonder that many Syrian refugees are resisting pressure to return home for the time being. 

A Return to the Regional Stage

From the outset of the Syrian war in 2011, relations between the Assad regime and other Arab states perished. Syria’s membership in the Arab League was suspended and sanctions were imposed. Shortly thereafter, many Gulf countries began arming rebel groups.  

Whatever moral gloss Arab regimes gave to these decisions – namely, Assad’s terrible violence towards protests, which lacked credibility given many Arab leaders unleashed violence onto their own protesters that year – they came from practical considerations.

There was a strong sense that the regime was broken and could only hold on for so long.

This prospect was then sunk by the ruthless intervention of Russian airpower, supported by Iran.

Although the country remains plagued by insecurity and sporadic conflict, the reconsolidation of the Assad regime is undeniable. Many Arab leaders believe that as Syria’s continued isolation serves no interest, it is necessary to welcome it back into the Arab fold.

Many Arab leaders believe that as Syria’s continued isolation serves no interest, it is necessary to welcome it back into the Arab fold.

Rolling back Iranian power in Syria is a key consideration of Arab states, whose anxieties have only been heightened by its increasing penetration of the country since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

They also want to clean up the risks posed by its ongoing instability to the wider region. With Syria no longer a core interest for Washington, fears abound about the revival of groups like ISIS once U.S. counter-terrorism operations abruptly withdraw, as predicted by Afghanistan. Therefore, the prospect of full normalization between Arab states appears irresistible.

Last June, Bahrain named its first full diplomatic mission to Syria in over a decade. Then in July, Algeria’s top diplomat revealed during a visit to Damascus that his government, alongside other Arab governments, was seeking to restore Syria’s Arab League membership.

Assad also had a call with Jordan’s King Abdullah II in October 2021.

Then in the first few days of 2023, the UAE’s foreign minister met with Assad to continue the thawing process between the two countries via economic cooperation. It came 10 months after Assad marked his first trip to a foreign country, aside from Russia and Iran, in the United Arab Emirates– which led the charge of Arab re-engagement with Assad by reopening its embassy in Syria in 2018.

These developments have been bitterly denounced by many who deem them a damaging blow to efforts seeking political change and justice in Syria.

Nonetheless, such critics might find solace in the fact that the far-reaching constraints of the Caesar Act’s sanctions on Syria have ensured that Arab re-engagement with Assad has amounted to little yet, nor has it yielded any material benefits to those, like the UAE, who have pioneered such efforts.

Then in the first few days of 2023, the UAE’s foreign minister met with Assad to continue the thawing process between the two countries via economic cooperation.

The full restoration of ties remains an aspiration rather than a reality for now.

Turkey is also showing signs of softening its hostilities towards Syria after a decade of supporting opposition to the Assad regime. In a striking shift in MENA geopolitics, top Turkish and Syrian defense and security officials held their first public meeting in more than a decade.

Frustrated by Washington’s unyielding assistance to the People's Defense Units (YPG), whom Turkey views as connected to its bloody rival, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), President Erdogan is seeking new partners to help dislodge the Kurdish presence in northern Syria.

Easing relations between Ankara and Damascus poses particular anxiety for the 4 million Syrian refugees who have taken shelter in Turkey since 2011.

These developments have created major headaches in the West.

The West’s legacy in Syria has been defined by the failure of the United Kingdom's government to win support for military intervention which, in turn, melted the resolve of the Obama administration to enforce its "red lines" against Assad alone.

After a decade of watching Syria crushed by, in part, the consequences of its indecision, the justification of Western sanctions against Assad is increasingly under fire.

Arguments citing the futility of sanctions to win concessions from Assad or any meaningful change are growing.

The prospect of normalizing relations with Assad after his unchecked violence and war crimes is disturbing, but, the argument proceeds, and so is the collective poverty of the Syrian people at the end of the country's darkest decade.

After a decade of watching Syria crushed by, in part, the consequences of its indecision, the justification of Western sanctions against Assad is increasingly under fire.

Citing this humanitarian rationalize, analogies are being made to Madeleine Albright’s jarring response to the question of sanctions on Saddam Hussein’s regime (following his invasion of Kuwait) which led to the deaths of half a million Iraqi children: “This is a very hard choice, but we think the price is worth it.”

It is unsurprising that the Biden administration is no longer actively at work to stop countries from engaging with Assad.

The realpolitik approach touted by Arab states, it seems, is slowly swaying the attitude of Washington. This does not mean that normalization will be anytime soon; simply that sanctions now look less likely to continue indefinitely against Syria.

Syria’s slow revival on the regional stage serves up the lesson that since the end of American hegemony in the Middle East, the use of violence by regimes reaps great reward and only temporary international risk.

A Raw Legacy

The 2011 uprisings in Syria represented another false spring in the Middle East. All efforts and sacrifices to create a new Syria have been swallowed up by the Assad regime and its allies.  The nightmare of Syria’s wasting revolution has left a chilling legacy of the risks associated with challenging Arab autocracy. Often the status quo is only fully appreciated once it has been disturbed. 

Despite this, popular protest remains a possibility while the population is choked by poverty and privation. The recurrence of small protests in southern Syria gives expression to the depths of desperation felt by most of the population today.    It is little wonder that many Syrian refugees are resisting pressure to return home for the time being.   

The nightmare of Syria’s wasting revolution has left a chilling legacy of the risks associated with challenging Arab autocracy. Often the status quo is only fully appreciated once it has been disturbed. 

In the West, Syria serves up a case-study in complete policy failure. With the failures of neoconservative policies so sharp in the minds of Western governments at the time, an emphatically just moment for limited intervention on humanitarian grounds was passed over.  This inaction confirmed the ending of American hegemony in the Middle East and called up a new, uncertain, and bloody dawn in regional affairs. A key feature of which, shown by Assad’s victory and slow international return, is that the use of violence by regimes reaps considerably more reward than risk.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of Al Bawaba News.